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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent seeks to sustain the granting of
swnmary judgment dismissing Appellants' Complaint and
granting judgment on Respondent's Amended Counterclaim.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On June 17, 1977, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor,
District Judge, heard arguments on Respondent's Motion for
Swnmary Judgment.

-

issues of fact.

___________..,

---------------

The parties stipulated that there were no
The case was submitted solely on the legal

issues concerning Appellants' affirmative defense based on
various provisions of the Utah Motor Vehicle Code.
Appellants' Complaint was dismissed, judgment was
entered on Respondent's Amended Counterclaim ordering
Appellants to surrender possession of the subject travel
trailer to Respondent or in the alternative, pay a money
judgment in the amount of $9,201.79 with interest and
costs.

Respondent was awarded attorney's fees in the amount

of $950.00.
Pursuant to the Court order, Respondent took
possession of the travel trailer.
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?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' Statement of Facts is incomplete and
inaccurate in some instances.

Through the use of inuendo,

Appellants suggest facts which are nonexistent or not a
matter of record.

For these reasons, Respondent desires to

set forth a more correct version of the facts.
It was stipulated in open court during the argument
on defendant's motion for summary judgment which gave rise
to this appeal that there were no issues of fact before the
court.

The parties agreed to submit the matter on the

pleadings, affidavits and exhibits submitted to the lower
court (R. 97}.
On or about July 26, 1976, Respondent sold a used
1973 Air Stream Travel Trailer to Appellants.

They took

possession of the trailer and made payments for the months
of August, September and October.

They ceased making

payments on the trailer and in December of 1976 filed a
complaint asking for rescission of the contract on the basis
that the trailer "is unfit for the implied and warranted
purposes in that the same cannot be licensed in the state of
I

Washington and other unknown states which plaintiffs [Appellant:(
require licenses in, and, therefore, cannot be used by
plaintiffs for its designated and intended use."
69,70,74).

(R. 2,

Appellants asked for no other relief than

rescission.
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The travel trailer, which is the subject of this
action, was purchased in 1974 by Respondent from Third Party
Defendant Motors Insurance Corporation (hereinafter "MIC").
The trailer had been stolen sometime prior to 1974 and had
been recovered by MIC, who received title because it had reimbursed its insured for loss of the trailer.

MIC submitted

the trailer to the state of Washington Department of Motor
Vehicles.

The trailer was inspected. Under the direction of

the Washington Highway Patrol, the trailer was reassigned a
valid vehicle identification number.

All requirements of

the state of Washington were met for the issuance of title
and relicensing of the trailer.

MIC obtained valid title.

(R. 76 through 83).
All motor vehicles, including travel trailers have
a vehicle identification number (VIN) stamped in several
locations on the vehicle.
is 131B3Sl849.

The correct VIN for the trailer

Apparently, the thieves who stole the unit

altered a VIN which is located on the door plate of the
trailer to 131B3S2839.

When the state of Washington Highway

Patrol reattached the correct and original number on the
right-front draw bar of the trailer, they failed to correct
the altered serial number on the door plate.

(R. 72,76-83) ·

At the time the trailer was sold to Appellants, an
employee of Respondent incorrectly recorded the altered
serial number from the door plate on the contract and title

-4-
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documents.

When Respondent submitted the title documents to

the State of Utah, they discovered their error and corrected
it.

(R. 72).
Although Appellants imply in paragraph 1 of the

Statement of Facts, page 4, Appellants' brief, that the
trailer was not licensed, it is an undisputed fact that the
trailer was validly titled and licensed in the State of Utah
when purchased.

At all times material to this cause of

action, the trailer has been and at the time of the argument
on defendant's motion for summary judgment, was licensed and
titled in the State of Utah.
The trailer can be licensed in the state of
Washington or in any other state of the Union.

(R. 76).

It

should be emphasized, that the trailer has gone through all
necessary steps for relicensing and retitling in the state
in which it was stolen, Washington, and in the state in
which it was purchased and used, Utah.

(R. 72,73,76-83).

After Appellants purchased, licensed and titled
the trailer in Utah, they took the vehicle to the state of
Washington.

Initially, the state of Washington refused to

title the vehicle.

It is assumed the vehicle inspector saw

the altered serial number on the door plate and failed to
check for the correct number.

Appellants contacted Responden

Respondent contacted the state of Washington which apologized
for its error and requested Appellants to resubmit the
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trailer for licensing.

Respondent contacted Appellants and

told them that Washington state would issue title and
license for the trailer.

Appellants never attempted to

license the trailer in Washington after Respondent contacted
them.

(R. 84-86).
Subsequent to the sale of the trailer, Respondent

negotiated the contract of purchase to Zions First National
Bank.

Contrary to the terms of the agreement, Appellants

failed to make the payments due under the contract.

(R. 69,

72,74,75).
In April of 1977, Zions First National Bank
assigned the contract back to Respondent and received
$9,211.79 as a pay off on the loan for the underlying
transaction.

(Ex. 1, 7 4, 7 5) •

Appellant makes a major misstatement of the facts
in paragraph 2, page 4, of the Statement of Facts.

Appellants'

brief states:
In addition to the above facts, the uncontroverted admissions and interrogatories indicated:
2. That the Travel Trailer was not
insurable (R. 85).
There is no statement in the record including page
85 which supports the statement that the trailer was uninsurable.

On page 85 of the Record, it states:
Request No. 2. Admit that the travel trailer
which is the subject matter of plaintiff's Complaint
-6-
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was insured under an insurance policy with Carava
.
h ad an expiration
nner
Insurance, I nc., sai. d po 1 icy
date of June 5, 1977.
(a) :

Denied.

There is no statement on this page or on any other
page of the Record which indicates that the trailer was
uninsurable.

In fact, Appellants' counsel knows that this

is not the case.

At the argument on the Motion for Summary

Judgment, Respondent's counsel produced a sworn affidavit
from Caravanners Insurance, Inc., which stated that the
travel trailer which is the subject matter of this action
was currently insured with said company, and that said
company knew of no reason why the trailer could not continue
to be insured with the company.

Through inadvertence, the

affidavit was not formally submitted to the court and,
therefore, is not a part of the record. However, Appellants'
counsel had the opportunity to review the affidavit and was
aware of its contents.
Appellants' Statement of Facts implies that
Respondent altered the serial number on the subject travel
trailer.

Such is not the case.

The serial number was

altered by those who stole the trailer.

The state of

Washington Highway Patrol failed to remove the

~ltered

number when it was retitled and when the correct VIN was
replaced on the unit.

Brasher's incorrectly recorded the

altered number on the sales documents.

That error was

quickly rectified.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF UTAH LAW WHICH WOULD RESULT IN
APPELLANTS' RECEIVING RESPONDENT'S TRAVEL TRAILER WITHOUT AN
OBLIGATION TO PAY FOR IT.
Introduction
Appellants seek, by a tortured application of 41~

3-3, UCA (1953), as amended, to be able to obtain Respondent's
travel trailer worth in excess of $10,000.00 with no obligation«~"'
to pay for it!
Quite simply, Appellants suggest that Respondent
violated 41-1-18, 41-1-120 and 41-20-1, which are included
within the scope of 41-3-3 by virtue of 41-3-23(a) (4) set
forth below.
A.

There Have Been No Violations of Utah Law.
41-3-3 UCA (1953), as amended, provides:
Penalties for violation of act.-- No action or
right of action to recover any such motor vehicle,
or any part of the selling price thereof, shall be
maintained in the courts of this state by any such
dealer or vendor, his successors or assigns, in
any case wherein such vendor or dealer shall have
failed to comply with the terms and provisions of
this act, and such vendor or dealer, upon conviction
for the violation of any of the provisions of this
act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $299
or by imprisonment for not more than six months in
the county jail, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Sections 41-1-18, 41-1-120, and 41-20-1 respectively

provide as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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41-1-18. Registration and certificates of title-Unlawful to violate provisions requiring.-- It
shall be unlawful for any person to drive or move
or for an owner knowingly to permit to be driven
or moved upon any highway any vehicle of a type
required to be registered hereunder which is not
registered or for which a certificate of title has
not been issued or applied for, or for which the
appropriate fee has not been paid when and as
required hereunder, except that when application
accompanied by proper fee has been made for
registration and certificate of title for a
vehicle it may be operated temporarily pending
complete registration upon displaying a temporary
permit duly verified, or other evidence of such
application, or otherwise under rules and regulations
promulgated by the commission.
41-1-120. Selling or buying vehicles without
manufacturers' numbers a felony. -- Any person who
knowingly buys, receives, disposes of, sells,
offers for sale or has in his possession any motor
vehicle or engine removed from a motor vehicle,
from which the manufacturer's serial or engine
number or other distinguishing number or identificatl!
mark or number placed thereon under assignment
from the department has been removed, defaced,
covered, altered or destroyed for the purpose of
concealing or misrepresenting the identify of said
motor vehicle or engine, is guilty of a felony.
41-20-1. Definitions.-- As used in this act:
(1) The words "American Standard" mean a
standard adopted and published by the American
National Standards Institute or the National Fiu
Protection Association.
(2) The words "mobile home" mean a vehicular,
portable structure built on a chassis and designed
to be used without a permanent foundation as a
dwelling when connected to indicated utilites.
(3) The words "travel trailer" mean a
vehicular, portable unit, mounted on wheels, not
requiring special highway movement permits when
drawn by a motorized vehicle:
(a)

Designed as a temporary dwelling

-9-
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for travel, recreational and vacation use;
and
(b)
When factory-equipped for the road,
having a body width· of not more than eight
feet and a body length of not more than forty
feet.

(4)
The words "motor home" mean a self-propelled vehicular unit, primarily designed as a
temporary dwelling for travel, recreational and
vacation use.
(5)
The words "recreational vehicle" mean a
vehicular unit, other than a mobile home, primarily
designed as a temporary dwelling for travel,
recreational and vacation use, which is either
self-propelled or is mounted on or pulled by
another vehicle, including but not limited to: a
travel trailer, a camping trailer, a truck camper,
and a motor home.

(6) The word "person" includes any individual,
firm, partnership, corporation, or other legal
entity.
Appellant argues that 41-1-18, 41-1-120 and 41-201 are included within the proscription of 41-3-3 by 41-3-

23(a)(4) which states:
41-3-23. Prohibited acts or omissions--Violation
by licensee.--(a)
It shall be unlawful and a
violation of this act for the holder of any
license issued under the terms and provisions
hereof:

(4)
To violate any law of the state of Utah
now existing or hereafter enacted respecting
commerce in motor vehicles or any lawful rule or
regulation respecting commerce in motor vehicles
promulgated by any licensing or regulating authority
now existing or hereafter created by the laws of
the state of Utah.
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Respondent did not violate 41-1-18 UCA (1953), as
amended.

That statute makes it unlawful for "any person to

drive or move or for an owner knowingly to permit to be
driven or moved upon any highway (any vehicle requiring
registration]."

[emphasis supplied].

There is no evidence

before this court that Respondent drove or moved the travel
trailer on the highway.

As a matter of fact, it did not.

Respondent was not the owner of the trailer--Appellant was.
Hence, the statute has no application.

There is no evidence

that the travel trailer was ever moved on the highway when
it was unregistered.

The only evidence before this court is

that the travel trailer was properly titled and licensed in
the state of Utah in the course of purchase and that during
the litigation it was relicensed in the state of Utah.
The only evidence of any registration problem in
Utah is that Respondent make a clerical error and recorded
the wrong identification number on the contract and title
documents.

This error was discovered, corrected and title

and license was issued.

Even if there were a

violatio~,

certainly, there was no knowing violation, as required by
the statute.
Respondent did not violate 41-1-120 UCA (1953), u
amended.

This section says that a violation requires a

-11-
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person knowingly buy, receive, dispose or sell a motor
vehicle or engine from a motor vehicle, from which the
manufacturer's serial engine number or identification number
has been removed, defaced, covered, altered or destroyed
"for the purpose of concealing or misrepresenting the
identify of said motor vehicle

" [emphasis supplied] is

guilty of a felony.
Although for some purposes of the code a travel
trailer is a "motor vehicle," for this section of the code,
a travel trailer is not a "motor vehicle."

A "motor vehicle"

is defined for the purposes of Chapter 1 in 41-1-l(b).

It

states:
(b)
"Motor Vehicle." Every vehicle which is
self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled
by electric power obtained from overhead trolley
wire, but not operated upon rails.
A trailer is defined as follows:
(g)
"Trailer." Every vehicle without motive
power designed for carrying persons or property
and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and so
constructed that no part of its weight rests upon
the towing vehicle.
Clearly, a travel trailer is not a motor vehicle
within the meaning of Chapter 1.
Assuming for purposes of argument that a travel
trailer is a motor vehicle within the purview of Chapter 1,
it requires a knowing violation for the purpose of concealing
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or misrepresenting the identity of the motor vehicle.

There

is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent was guilty of any
such conduct.
There is no violation of 41-20-1 UCA (1953), as
amended.

This section is merely a definitional section. It

contains no affirmative duties.
Appellant on page 8 of its brief, argues that the
travel trailer did not have an inscription on the trailer
permanently identifying the trailer as a travel trailer.
There is no evidence to support this contention in the
record. More importantly, that requirement of 41-20-1 was
removed from the statute by the 1971 amendment and is no
longer contained therein.
B.

41-3-3 Must Be Construed So As Not To Lead To

An

Absurd

and Unjust Result.
Assuming, arguendo, that there is some type of
technical violation of the act by Respondent, it would be an
absurd and unjust result which would grant to the plaintiff
the huge windfall of receiving a travel trailer without
having to pay for it.

Surely, the legislature, in passing

41-3-3, did not intend to encourage those buying travel
trailers to cease payments thereon in hope that some technica:
violation would give them the travel trailer free of all
encumbrances.
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In

Rowley~

Public Service Commission, et al.,

112 U 116, 185 P. 2d 514 (1947), the appellant was arguing
for what would have been an absurd or unjust interpretation
of the statute dealing with the regulation of contract
carriers.

The appellant argued that the literal inter-

pretation of the various laws regulating contract carriers
would mean that his rights would have been preserved under
the grandfather provision of the applicable acts, even
though he was in violation of the law during the grandfather
period.

This Court recognized that such an intention could

not rationally be found in the statute and stated:
[W]hen the legislative intent is not clear and
certain, and a literal interpretation of the
language of the statute gives an absurd result,
then the court is justified in searching the
enactment for further indication of legislative
intent. These indications can be determined by
the wording of the act or by considering the
underlying reasons •.• and the purposes to be
accomplished. 185 P. 2d at 520.
[This language
was approved in Anderson ~ Utah County, 368 P. 2d
912 (1962)]
In light of the history of amendment and change of
41-3-1, et seq. and in light of the shocking results which
would attach to this case if appellant were allowed to apply
this section as argued, this court has a duty to interpret
that section to avoid such an unjust result. As is stated in
73 Am Jur 2d Statutes, §265:
A statute subject to interpretation is presumed
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not to have been intended to produce absurd
consequences, but to have the most reasonable
operation that its language permits.
If possible
doubtful provisions should be given a reasonable '
rational, sensible, and intelligent construction'.
These rules prevail where they are not restrained
by the clear language of the statute.
Under this
rule, general terms in a statute should be so
limited in their application as not to lead to
absurd consequences.
Thus, in interpreting §41-3-3, the initial question
must be to what motor vehicles does this section refer when
it says "any such motor vehicle."

The word "any" may be

given a restrictive interpretation while the word "such"
should be given the effect called for in its context.
Sections 41-3-1 through 41-3-5, as originally
enacted in 1937, constituted a separate act having the
following stated statutory purpose:
An Act to Regulate the Business of Selling Used
Motor Vehicles by Dealers Not Residing in or
Having a Permanent Place of Business in the State
of Utah, and by Resident Dealers Purchasing,
Handling and Selling Used Motor Vehicles Received
or Acquired From Nonresident Dealers; Requiring
All Used Cars Brought Into the State for the
Purpose of Sale to Be Registered With the State
Tax Commission, All Such Dealers to Execute and
Deliver to Each Purchaser of a Used Motor Vehicle
a Bond Indemnifying the Purchaser Against Failure
of Title or Breach of Warranty or Fraudulent
.
Misrepresentations, and the Delivery of a Certif1ca'
of Title to the Vendee; Defining Terms, and
Providing Penalties for the Violation of the
Provisions of This Act.
Laws of Utah, Chapter 69,
1937.

The act in using the phrase "any such motor
vehicle," referred only to those motor vehicles mentioned ir.
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41-3-1 [which is now repealed] , dealing only with nonresident dealers and the requirement to register motor
vehicles transferred into the state within ten days and
posting a bond thereon, and 41-3-2 [which is currently in
effect) dealing with the requirement to deliver title to a
vendee of a used motor vehicle within forty-eight hours.

Id.
Chapter 3 of Title 41 has subsequently been
expanded through amendment, but an analysis of what has been
added, makes it clear that

~he

remedy provided by §41-3-3

was not meant to apply to the additions.

§§41-3-6 through

41-3-27 were added in 1949. These sections deal with definitions,
provide for an administrator and an advisory board to
administer and enforce the act, define procedural matters,
stipulate types of licenses that dealers and salesmen can
obtain, state the required fees to obtain the licenses and
how the fees are to be used, explain the requirements for
filing bonds, and detail the administrator's hearings and
the effect thereof.

Only §41-3-23, "Prohibited Acts or

Omissions" refers to motor vehicles in a context which might
be applicable to 41-3-3.
For example, 41-3-23(3) makes it unlawful for a
licensee to knowingly purchase, sell, transport or otherwise
handle stolen motor vehicles.

§41-3-23(4), which is relied

upon by Appellant, makes it unlawful to violate any law
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dealing with conunerce in motor vehicles.

§41-3-23(a) deals

with restricting licensees from dismanteling a motor vehicle
without a permit.

The whole context of 41-3-23 deals with

prohibited acts of licensees.

The subject matter is not

motor vehicles, but licensees.

Thus, applying the reference

of nany such motor vehicle" in 41-3-3 to 41-3-23 ,wherein the
subject matter is not motor vehicles, but licensees, is
tenuous at best.
In addition, the act added in 1949 provided its
own penalty provision.

§41-3-27 describes the penalty for

violations of this act [meaning 41-3-6 through 41-3-27).
The terminology used in 41-3-27 in many ways is redundant to
the penalties imposed by 41-3-3.

No mention is made in 41-

3-27 of a bar to recovery of a "motor vehicle" because,as
mentioned above, motor vehicles were not the subject matter
of the 1949 addition.
While one could argue that losing a right to
recover a motor vehicle is a "penalty" to a dealer, such a
penalty does not comport with the nature of the other
penalties imposed (misdemeanor), nor with the general public
policy of not allowing one to benefit from his own wrongdoinc
as it applies to the facts of this case.

Hence, the additioc

of 41-3-27 apparently evidences a legislative intent to
retain the effect of the penalty of 41-3-3 as applying only
to the 1937 act, while the penalty of 41-3-27 was added to

-17-
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apply to the 1947 act.
§§41-3-28 through 41-3-37 were added to Chapter 3
of Title 41 in 1953 and likewise do not discuss "motor
vehicles" in the context where the reference from 41-3-3("any such motor vehicle") would be applicable.

These

sections deal with allowing temporary permits and special
plates, not with motor vehicles per se.

In conclusion, the

phrase "any such motor vehicle" as is used in 41-3-3 must
refer only to those motor vehicles described in the original
1937 act.
In any event, the legislature could not have
intended that 41-3-3 would apply to a dealer who had in good
faith complied with the law in all respects, but because of
a clerical error, might have been guilty of a technical
violation.
C.

41-3-3 Is Not Applicable to Resident Dealers.
This court held in Clearfield State Bank

~

Peters

Plumbing, 10 u 2d 136, 349 P. 2d 618 (1960), that §41-3-3
was only applicable to non-resident dealers.

Respondent is

a Utah corporation duly qualified and doing business in the
state of Utah and, hence, is a resident dealer.
In Clearfield, supra, "A" sold a car to "B," but
kept title until "B" paid for it.
draft for the transaction.
car on time to "D."

"P," a bank, handled the

"B," a used car dealer, sold the

"B" then assigned the security agreement
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and note received from
paid
11

11

A

11

11

0" to the same bank,

for the car, so "A

0," upon learning that

payments to "B,
the title.

11

11

11

A

11

11

kept the title.

11

P.

11

"B

11

never

The purchaser,

had the title, refused to make

and made them to

11

A," eventually receiving

P" brought suit against "D

The Utah Supreme Court held that

11

P

11

11

to recover the car.

was not barred from

bringing suit by §§41-3-2 and 41-3-3 as "D" asserted,
because those sections applied only to non-residents.
Appellants argue in their brief that Clearfield
has been overruled because 41-3-l was repealed by the 1967
legislature.

He cites no legislative history or authority

for this proposition, and the restrictive application as set
forth in Clearfield still applies to the remaining portions
of the statute.

From the title of the act, supra, page

15, it is clear that it was intended to apply to non-residenc
dealers.

Absent some specific showing, there is no basis to

assume as Appellant has that by repealing Section l, the
legislature has overruled Clearfield.
POINT II
APPELLANTS MADE NO SHOWING TO SUBSTANTIATE A CAUSE OF ACTIO:;
FOR RESCISSION.
Appellants' Complaint was narrowly drawn to ask
the court for the remedy of rescission.

There is no cause

of action stated for damages or for any other type of
relief.

It is so well supported so as not to need recitatiC
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of authority that rescission, as an equitable remedy, will
only lie when the party requesting rescission has an inadequate
remedy at law.
Appellants have made no such showing.

In fact,

the record is totally devoid of any basis for rescission at
all.

Assuming all interpretations of the facts in favor of

Appellants, all they have shown is that there was a clerical
error made on the sales documents, and upon initial presentation
of the trailer to the Washington state authorities, they
refused to license it.

It is undisputed,.that the trailer

was licensed and is licensed in the state of Utah and that
it can be licensed in the state of Washington.

If Appellants

have suffered anything, they have suffered a minor inconvenience,
which was remedied promptly by the Respopdent. Surely, these
facts do not constitute sufficient grounds to invoke the
court of equity to grant the drastic remedy of rescission.
Thus, the trial court was imminently correct in dismissing
plaintiffs' Complaint.
CONCLUSION
What Appellants seek to have this court do is
create an enormously unjust result.

They seek to have this

court award them an expensive travel trailer with no obligation to pay for it.

Respondent has done everything in

its power to comply in good faith with the laws of the state
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of Utah.

Its compliance is evidenced by the fact that the

travel trailer has been licensed and titled in this state
and can be licensed in the state of Washington. Respondent
has violated no law.

Appellants have shown no grounds for

the relief they are requesting.
The decision of the lower court should be affirmed
because (1) Respondent has not violated any Utah law which
would bring §41-3-3 into operation;

(2) Even if Respondent

were guilty of a technical violation of 41-3-3, the statute
must be construed so as not to lead to an absurd and unjust
result;

(3) This court has held that 41-3-3 does not apply

to resident dealers; and (4) Appellants' proof is woefully
inadequate to justify the granting of the equitable remedy
of rescission.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~ay

of February, lf

J~/

Jeffrey N. lclayton, of
MOYLE & DRAPER
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I hand delivered true
and correct copies of Respondent's Brief to Robert M. McRae
and Robert J. Haws, Attorneys for Appellants, 370 East Fifth
south, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111; and to Alan D. Frandsen,

Attorney for defendant Motors Insurance, 353 East Fourth
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

/J;..IA.-day of

February, 1978.

~/

I
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